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Book Reviews
By Michael Wheeler.t Boston:
Beacon Press, 1974. Pp. 194. $7.50.
No-FAULT DIVORCE.

No-Fault Divorce deals primarily with the concept of fault or guilt
in marriage as the basis for granting a divorce and the problems
inherent in such an approach. This is the outgrowth of canon or
ecclesiastical law, which rooted marriage in a sacrament by which
the parties enter into an undissolvable agreement between themselves and the divinity. In discussion of no-fault divorce in most
states, including Pennsylvania, the interrelationship between
grounds and defenses must be considered. A party filing for divorce
must have a ground, such as cruelty, adultery, indignities, etc., and
must additionally be innocent of any wrongdoing. In the event the
defending spouse also has a ground, or the petitioning spouse has
provoked the charged wrong, condoned the spouse's wrongdoing, or
engaged in collusive activity, there could be no divorce as both
parties would then be equally at fault. No-fault would eliminate the
grounds as well as all defenses and, in theory, the marriage would
be dissolved when it was simply no longer viable.
The theory of the no-fault ground would be to look not at guilt or
wrongdoing, but to inquire only as to whether the marriage, as an
emotional and social union, in reality continues to exist. The author
points out numerous instances of hypocrisy, harsh court battles,
vindictiveness and hostility created by the fault concept. The paradoxes of the law, improperly utilized to frustrate or facilitate divorce, have created great pressures for change even though, politically, change in this area is, at times, difficult to achieve.
The author discusses the various approaches to implementing nofault divorce laws adopted by various states. California led the way
in 1970 by abolishing "divorce" and replacing it with what is called
"dissolution of marriage."' All fault-related grounds were eliminated and a no-fault standard of irreconcilable differences which
have caused an irremediable breakdown of the marriage was instituted. 2 By 1972 seven states had followed California's lead in abolt
1.
2.

Professor of Law, New England School of Law, Boston.
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4500-40 (West 1970).
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506 (West 1970). A second ground, incurable insanity, was included,
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ishing fault-based grounds and replacing them with the maritalbreakdown standard.3 Other states, while not eliminating fault,
have added a ground similar to irretrievable breakdown.4
Divorce reform in California, as in many states, started as an
investigation of divorce and family problems in general, with a view
toward resolving domestic problems and reducing the ever increasing divorce rate. In practice, the battle over "fault" has been eliminated and the act has been construed to practically permit divorce
on demand by one of the parties. The consequence has been a 50%
increase in divorces, fewer migratory divorces and, to some extent,
"do-it-yourself" divorces. Affidavits without a court appearance
became the practice in Contra Costa County, but the Supreme
Court of California curtailed this practice by requiring that the
courts retain some discretion in determining whether the breakdown
did in fact occur.'
Critics of no-fault claim the new laws should provide guidelines
as to what constitutes a breakdown, while supporters believe that
this would, in effect, re-introduce fault. To adequately determine
whether these guidelines had been met would require an evaluation
of the state of the marriage, an inquiry which proponents of no-fault
very often do not wish courts to make at all. These proponents argue
that while fault would be eliminated from the divorce proceeding,
some lawyers might continue to use these hearings as opportunities
to introduce evidence of marital wrongdoing aimed at influencing
the judge's decision on such collateral issues as alimony, support,
and custody.
but for practical purposes the irreconcilable differences ground is the true basis for dissolution
of marriage.
3. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-6 (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (1971); IOWA CODE §
598.17 (1971); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.110 (1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.86 (Cum. Supp.
1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-347 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.025 (1971). In addition,
the Commission on Uniform Laws formulated a no-fault divorce uniform law but was unable
to obtain approval or adoption by the American Bar Association-the first uniform proposal
rejected by the ABA in the 80 year history of the Commission.
4. IDAHO CODE § 32-603(8) (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:7-a (1973); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-05-03(8) (1971); Tsx. FAM. CODE § 3.01 (1971). Divorces are also available without
determination of fault under state statutes permitting divorce based upon a legal separation.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2(d) (1973); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5) (McKinney 1974) (requires a signed separation agreement or a court decree establishing the fact of separation);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1974) (provides the shortest separation period of any state
statute upon which a divorce will be granted-six months). Other state statutes, while including the ground of incompatibility, have been interpreted so narrowly as to require evidence
amounting to cruelty. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.110(5) (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1.1 (1973);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961).
5. McKim v. McKim, 17 Cal. App. 3d 499, 95 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1971).
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One of the glaring weaknesses of divorce reform has been a failure
to devise an adequate approach to alimony and support payments.
These are areas where punishment and fault are important considerations. Because of the unequal economic status of the parties, a
woman's lesser ability to support herself, and the belief that both
parties create the wealth in a family, fault is a necessary legal concept. The husband rarely pays the full amount of the order and the
wife rarely receives enough to survive. The hostility and resentment
on both sides is enormous. Fault enters into consideration of the
amount and whether or not an award is to be granted. Many states
discriminate against men by denying them alimony payments. Ability to pay and "other circumstances" such as fault govern the
amount. Eliminating the fault ground of divorce means more alimony cases are then tried in court rather than settled, resulting in
the battleground being transferred.
California' has attempted to eliminate this conflict by calling it
spousal support and basing an award primarily on need, looking to
duration of marriage and the ability of the supported spouse to
engage in gainful employment. Community property laws assist in
the division of marital property, and the elimination of fault further
reduces the conflict. It is hard to eliminate fault in practice, however. The Uniform Act would eliminate fault and base disposition
of property on need; thus, one spouse could receive more than 50%.
Florida has eliminated fault, awarding alimony only on need, so
that orders to women have been reduced to the eitent necessary to
encourage the wife to end her financial dependence on her estranged
spouse. This concept has had a harsh result on women, often resulting in no support or alimony for many women, even when deserving.
The Texas no-fault support and alimony provision has produced a
new poverty class composed of middle-aged women. The author
quotes authority which suggests that such policies externalize the
cost of divorce by placing the burden on the taxpayer.
The problem of dealing with children of divorce has also been
largely unresolved in divorce reform. The most sensible and important consideration is to provide counsel for the child. Too often an
improper resolution of the child's status is worked out to its disadvantage by emotionally incompetent parents who see only their
problem. Children can suffer from parents who should divorce but
don't, and those who should not divorce but do. The problems of the
6.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 4806 (West 1974).
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child survive the divorce and in this sense the relationship is never
terminated. When fitness of the parent is the test, each parent often
tries to prove the other to be unfit. If "best interest" is the test, legal
fitness of a parent would not necessarily be determinative of the
child's best interest. Sometimes a parent legally unfit would be
better while, in other instances, neither might be the best solution.
Under present law it is difficult to determine if the child is really
properly placed. Much of the difficulty in custody cases is inherent
in the marital problem. Courts and law may mitigate, but cannot
eradicate, the harm.
The uniform laws on divorce7 provide for the "best interest of the
child" test. Some think that procedure rather than substantive law
holds the key to improvement in custody proceedings. Appointing
an attorney for the child is basic. The child's "rights" have to be
considered even to the extent of denying a divorce if overly detrimental to the child. Another possibility is a family arbitrator or
committee of persons the parties know personally. This concept has
severe limitations since the great number of cases makes consistent,
long range supervision impossible. The lack of authority of the court
and requirement of consent of both parents, as well as the large
number of people involved with the child, make acceptance of this
approach unlikely. For the above reasons, the author suggests that
court and state sponsored counseling should go where it can do the
most good to those families with children.
There is also a need for greater use of behavioral science. Lawyers
and judges must, however, become more knowledgeable in the area
so that behavioral science concepts are given only the legal weight
they deserve. While permanence of custody orders is necessary,
there must be room for change. Meddling by hostile parents should
not be permitted. Migratory custody actions somehow must be
eliminated. A Uniform Child Custody Act is needed and, in effect,
no-fault custody is desirable to the extent that the child is given the
best treatment possible. Custody law changes must be effected at
the time of change in divorce laws.
In divorce reform, conciliation is one of the centers of controversy.
Many lawyers oppose it; the Catholic Church insists on it; the
American Bar Association demands it; and legislatures accept it in
theory only. It is generally non-compulsory, under-financed and
7.

UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402.
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doomed to failure. If society is committed to preserving the family,
the court should be involved in counseling and, by so doing, the
court should show that there is a larger social interest in saving
marriages. Delays of conciliation procedure can benefit the parties,
but if nothing is done in the interim, it could also do harm. The
strongest argument against counseling is that it invades privacy.
The effect of the difference of varying state commitments to the
program can be illustrated. New York's program, with eight counselors for the entire state, was doomed to failure and has achieved

only 5% success in conciliation. Wisconsin and California, on the
other hand, are very successful as a result of adequate staffing and
funding. Even if reconciliation is not accomplished, counseling can
smooth the divorce and assist in resolving economic and custody
matters. Every state studying divorce reform has concluded that
conciliation is necessary to offset easing of divorce laws; yet, virtually none of the recommendations regarding counseling have been
fully implemented.
The author also reviews the effect of divorce on legal practice.
Divorce is a hard, emotional, and difficult proceeding for both
clients and lawyers. Whatever lawyers do to further reform is considered by many to be self-serving. Many lawyers see reform as a
threat to their livelihood and consider no-fault to be no-lawyer
divorce. However, wherever no-fault has been introduced it has
benefited lawyers. While more divorces (uncomplicated ones) are
do-it-yourself, the resulting increase in divorce more than compensates. Judges are reluctant to advise litigants or guide them
through the procedure. Lawyers are needed in custody, support,
and property matters. Because there are more divorces, there are
more collateral problems and more business for lawyers.
The author points out that the politics of reform are complex.
Those who desire reform seek different and contradictory changes.
The fragmentation makes for ineffective political action. Reform
takes on the color and culture of the state in which it is implemented.
The author alleges that migratory divorce is lessened by no-fault
as the need to travel is eliminated. Nevada divorces dropped 15%
after no-fault was introduced in California. Divorce-mill states lose
their appeal since the legal complexities of migratory divorce can
be enormous.
Migratory divorce law has existed for one century, and until there
is a uniform law equally liberal in all places, it will continue. There
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will always be one or two states which won't go along. Tightening
up on marriage laws is also needed-easy marriage makes for more
frequent divorce. While Nevada's divorce business has been depressed, its marriage-mill business booms.
The author has made a thorough review of the complexities of
divorce and the no-fault divorce movement in this country. He has
reviewed most points of view and has considered the pros and cons
of each. Despite the author's best efforts at supporting a no-fault
approach, it is unlikely that this book will convince proponents of
one view to adopt the other. The effects of marital breakdown are
becoming increasingly evident in terms of social and economic costs
which may not be tolerable in the long run. The movement for
children's rights is on a collision course with that of divorce-ondemand. The feminist movement, too, is not faring well in this
regard. It would be well for the reader to be aware that absolute
freedom in any social undertaking can result in license and anarchy,
instead of liberty.
In conclusion, the author asserts that laws regulating social relations such as marriage and divorce are less effective than those
relating to business and commerce. If the laws don't reflect social
practice and values, people will work out their own relationships.
To serve families, we must start much earlier than the time divorce is sought. Sometimes in divorce actions the battle is more
important than the separation or the loot. Fault fosters the battle.
No-fault tends to reduce it. However, even in successful marriages
there is a time when most couples believe it can't work. A quick
divorce would destroy these.
The reviewer believes a sensible national policy on the family,
which would include education, family centers, and affirmative efforts to strengthen the family, is needed. Rampant divorce is a
symptom of a fragmented society. Divorce should be reasonably
available, but it should not penalize the weak or pander to the
morally and emotionally crippled. The concern for children can no
longer be entirely subsidiary to the desires of the parents. No-fault
divorce can only be justifiable as long as economic justice to both
parties is preserved and reasonable measures are incorporated to
protect children and preserve viable marriages. Any other approach,
which in effect converts the proceeding to divorce-on-demand, is as
hypocritical as the evil the reform seeks to remedy.
Patrick R. Tamilia*
*Judge, Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania; Adjunct Professor, Duquesne University School of Law.
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HANDBOOK OF ZONING
NANCES-WITH FORMS. By

AND

LAND

USE

ORDI-

Clan Crawford, Jr.t Ingle-

wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974. Pp. 207.
$17.95.
The scarcity of helpful literature on the techniques of legal draftsmanship, particularly as to statutory materials, is surprising. Only
recently have the law schools, forsaking somewhat their stance
against trade-school subjects, begun to include draftsmanship
courses in their curricula. That step, however, does/little to help
practitioners and law-trained legislators now in the field.
Practitioner Crawford has entered the draftsmanship gap with a
useful and unpretentious little book which can be very helpful but
must be used with some important cautions. It deals with zoning
ordinances, the most complex products of local governing bodies,
with the sole exception of comprehensive building codes. In contrast
to excellent, available national model building codes,' there are no
national model zoning ordinances, nor are there likely to be any.
In the past, lawyer draftsmen have been so chary of zoning ordinances, or have botched zoning-code writing so badly, that professional city planners have taken over that area of draftsmanship,
though not without some ill-conceived resistance from the organized
bar.'
The Crawford handbook, based on the author's experience as a
land-use control lawyer, city councilman and zoning board of appeals member, is a pragmatic tool indeed. He starts with the fundamentals of organizing a zoning ordinance and numbering its sections, 3 displaying the reality of his experience by avoding any
suggestion for the lettered subsections and sub-subsections which

t Member of the Michigan Bar; Chairman, American Bar Association Committee on
Planning and Zoning in the Section of Local Government Law.
1. See, e.g., BUILDING OFFICIALS CONFERENCE OF AMERICA, BASIc BUILDING CODE (1972).

2.

D.

3.

C. CRAWFORD, HANDBOOK OF ZONING AND LAND USE ORDINANcES-WITH FORMS

HAGMAN, URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT

368-75 (1973).
21 (1974).
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are so unutterably difficult to cite orally. The handbook does not
merely give some principles on writing the formal definitions which
are important in zoning codes; after very brief introductory remarks,
4
it sets forth a model set of definitions.
The solutions recommended for the classic zoning classification
problems are refreshingly confident and concise, if not a bit glib.
Questions dealing with mobile homes and mobile home parks, with
which many suburbs are now wrestling mightily, are met in a couple
of pages,5 with the suggestion that a special district for individuallysited mobile homes and a special district for mobile home parks
both be created.
A chapter is devoted to the site plan approval device and process.6
Mr. Crawford displays his capacity for forthright criticism by pointing out that the site plan device has been used by some municipal
officials to extort concessions from developers. He joins in condemning that abuse, but does not do any better than anybody else in
suggesting explicit standards by which well-intended officials could
implement equitable approaches.
The handbook expends only three short pages on draftsmanship
suggestions for the wide field of legal nonconforming uses,' which is
just not enough to list the problems, much less to suggest vehicles
to deal with them. Not much more space is spent on the more
esoteric areas of air rights, greenbelts, and aesthetics. In fact, only
117 of the 207 pages constitute the text of the handbook. The remaining pages are the forms. I have to note that the author has
candidly labeled the forms as "representative" and does not claim
that they are models at all.
The forms are copies of all or part of three zoning ordinances. One
of them is the zoning ordinance of Lenox, Massachusetts, which is
interesting because it must be the shortest zoning ordinance in the
world, occupying only six printed pages. A few more pages are devoted to the greenbelt provisions used by Grayling Township,
Michigan, for the protection of the AuSable River. Because the AuSable is Michigan's best known trout stream and a delightful watercourse for canoeing, Mr. Crawford leaves unbroken the Michigander
policy of never writing a book without bringing fishing into it.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

23-27.
39-41.
66-70.
76-78.
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The big representative form is an extensive reprint of the Zoning
Ordinance of the City of Troy, Michigan. Because Troy's ordinance
is definitely not a model to be followed closely, the reader could
obtain a similar result by simply borrowing a half-decent zoning
ordinance from a neighboring community before he sets out to do
some drafting. However, that approach would not provide the benefit of the critical footnotes which the author has appended to the
Troy zoning ordinance. His comments are pithy and unsparing: he
describes one provision as leaving "much to be desired"; 8 certain
controls as "ineffective"; 9 another section as "rather vague to say
the least";'" and yet another provision as "of questionable validity."'" He characterizes one portion as seeming to be "inconsistent."'" Another footnote refers to a particular aspect of the ordinance as constituting something like a floating zone which is, he
says, "a no-no in many states.' 3 Thus, instead of a model, we get
a critique, and the usefulness of the critique cannot be denied.
The major caution to observe with respect to this zoning ordinance handbook arises from the pervasive assumption that the attorney or legislator is also the planner as to the substance of ordinance content. Despite a slight bow to the need for "the professional
skills" of city planners in the introduction,'4 Mr. Crawford plunges
into a discussion of the determination of zoning district boundaries
without a single mention of the importance of a thorough planning
analysis preceding the decisions on district configuration.
Throughout the handbook, quantitative measures are offered,
sometimes with a caution that they should not be adopted directly
-as in the case of the particular measures in density controlsbut in other instances, without any such qualifications. The suggested off-street parking standards are not limited to being purely
illustrative. With respect to sales establishments, there is at least
one error or misprint which could cause trouble for the scrivener who
might adopt it unquestioningly. The off-street parking standard for
enumerated types of retail stores is one parking space per 800 square
feet of store area while, on the same page, another standard for
8. Id. at 127 n.12.
9. Id. at 129 n.16.
10. Id. at 147 n.35.
11. Id. at 149 n.38.
12. Id. at 151 n.40.
13. Id. at 167 n.55.
14. Id. at 8.
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retail stores is one parking space per 150 square feet of floor space."
The 800 square foot figure seems to be in error because national
planning standards currently recommend a ratio of one parking
space to about 180 square feet of internal floor area. 6
The problem is not with a particular error but with the failure of
the handbook to point out that professional standards are available
to the draftsman from many sources outside of the handbook itself.
The author's caution on not adopting his density standards should
desirably be extended to all of the planning content which is presented.
Nevertheless, Mr. Crawford's handbook is a useful, and often
delightful, tool. Upon reading it, there is a feeling of having met Mr.
Crawford at some law conference and having gleaned a great many
useful pointers from his wide experience. His own personality comes
through; in fact, the personal thrust is enhanced by the fact that the
book carries a photograph of the author himself on an inside page,
not just on a dust jacket blurb.
Mr. Crawford says that he is "not ready to give up on zoning."
Well, we are not ready to give up on Mr. Crawford. He has written
a book worth many times its price in providing solid advice and
friendly company for the attorney engaged in the lonely business of
writing land-use control regulations from scratch.
David W. Craig*

Go

EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS. By William 0.

Douglas.t New York: Random House, 1974. Pp. xv,
493. $10.00.
Because I have always been an admirer of William 0. Douglas, it
15. Id. at 64.
16. UmaAN LAND INSTITUTE, Parking Requirements for Shopping Centers, Technical Bulletin No. 53 (Nov. 1965).
* Past president, American Society of Planning Officials; Adjunct Professor, CarnegieMellon University; Member of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania Bar.

t

Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
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did not seem patently necessary to bolster my predilections by reading his life story, Go East, Young Man. However, since it was a gift
and for want of better things to keep myself occupied on a commuter
bus, I began flipping pages-the first fifteen or so contain only
pictures-with half-hearted enthusiasm. This cursory glancing soon
turned to deliberate perusal as it became readily evident that there
was much more to be learned about the author than what could be
gleaned from legal opinions or news articles.
Actually this autobiography, over a decade in preparation and
writing, is the first of a two-volume work that will span the life of
the longest tenured Supreme Court Justice.' Chronologically, this
installment essentially traces the author's life from an improverished childhood to his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1939.
I say essentially because, for purposes of cohesion, he often refers
to later years. In recapturing those "early years," as he callsthem,
Justice Douglas relates countless experiences to the reader through
effortlessly simplistic prose. The book does provide enjoyable reading for many reasons, far too many to be adequately dealt with ina
brief book review. Suffice it to say even his harshest detractors
would be hard put to conclude that this work offers "no redeeming
social importance." 2 Seriously though, this work is educational in
that it touches upon the disciplines of economics, history, sociology,
business, politics, ecology, literature, government, psychology, law
(of course), and a myriad of other topics that easily provide something of interest for everyone. And for those who would eschew the
truly erudite features of this book, there are other palatable tidbits
of information worthy of attention: the author's being mistaken for
Spencer Tracy and Casey Stengel; Learned Hand's penchant for offcolor stories; that the sweetest of wildlife meats is the chicken hawk;
FDR's love of poker; and more.
In conjunction with his underlying narrative, Justice Douglas has
compiled a potpourri of short stories which he has somehow interwoven into twenty-six diverse chapters, each populated with periodic cross-referencing for sustained continuity. Apart from being
meticulously researched and documented, the book is well written,
elegantly concise in form, and seemingly exhaustive in content. The
longest chapter (The Securities and Exchange Commission) details
1. Mr. Justice Douglas established the record for longest service in the Court's history on
October 29, 1973. See Tribute to Mr. Justice Douglas, 416 U.S. H (1974).
2. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the inner workings of the SEC, on which he served (later as Chairman) for five years. Students or practitioners of high finance should
find it pleasureable and informative. While there are some chapters
(Columbia and Yale Faculties, Small-Town Teaching) that are intolerably boring, the major portion of the book renders a fascinating
account of the sometimes stormy but always enduring life of this
civil libertarian. The earlier chapters are especially gripping, for
they portray the author as an often naive lad and one who, despite
his innate righteousness, was every bit as much a kid as you and
I-maybe even more so. 3 These segments also lend credence to his
natural intelligence, for they vividly describe his recognition of social sickness at a very tender age (the depraved struggle of
bootleggers, prostitutes, hobos, and others deemed societal outcasts
by a puritan ethic fostered his "resentment against hypocrites in
church clothes who raise their denunciations against the petty criminals, while their own sins mount high"); 4 his disdain for Christmas
because so few descried its true meaning; his witness to unjust treatment of Indians, Orientals, Blacks and other minorities. Being
fatherless at age six, he matured rapidly, and his self-exposure to
life's realities forged early the liberal philosophies that would later
designate him chief spokesman of environmental conservationists,
political prisoners, the underprivileged, and the oppressed. Yes,
these chapters on growing up very adroitly convey to the reader why
Justice Douglas is considered the axiomatic "flaming liberal" by his
many critics. Stand advised, however, that these youthful recollections are not all shrouded with pathos. He was not yet adolescent
when he formed a lasting appreciation and love for the wilderness
through backpacking. Mountain streams, wooded valleys, the Cascades, and other gifts of nature were his playground near home in
Yakima, Washington.
In subsequent chapters one sees how formal education and hard
work earned Justice Douglas expertise in fields of bankruptcy and
securities. Coupling this with varied professional encounters, he
3. Our backyard neighbor on Sixth Avenue was a man whom we disliked. He was
small and wiry, and thoroughly obnoxious. We spent hours each Halloween in wait for
him to leave his home and enter his outhouse. Once we heard the latch click, we would
give one big heave and push it over with the door down, leaving him two possible exits.
W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARs. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O.

DOUGLAS 27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as EAST].
4. Id. at 62.
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candidly explains why he came to mistrust the corporate establishment.
Always a controversial figure, he makes sporadic reference to the
public outcries precipitated by such acts as his visiting Soviet Russia in the fifties and staying execution in the Rosenberg case.5 Of
course, he was a "New Dealer," and for some that was enough to
associate him with anti-Americanism. Shrugging off all criticism
with an air of indifference, his retort is simple: "Anyone in public
life who deals with controversial issues makes enemies, and an
enemy is eager to cut one down for any reason, great or small."6
Probably the most noteworthy feature this work offers is the characterization of his innumerable friends and acquaintances from
well-known to unknown. In fact, one chapter is devoted to nothing
else. The more interesting passages pertain to those people who
most influenced his life in both direction and purpose; another
chapter, describing his special fondness for Louis Brandeis and
Hugo Black, is by far the most captivating. Ranking a close second
is the product of his jocular tendencies. Justice Douglas has spiced
his writing throughout with amusing quips and humorous anecdotes; one which he derived from Hugo Black (an adept storyteller) I felt to be particularly noteworthy.
It seems that a sharecropper was charged with the crime of
stealing the mule of the landlord. The latter was rich and domineering, without many friends among the common people. The
evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, so much so
that he did not take the stand. The judge charged the jury,
laying down the law meticulously. In five minutes the jury
returned.
"Have you reached a verdict, Mr. Foreman?" asked the
judge.
"We have, your Honor."
"Then hand it to the clerk."
The clerk put on his glasses, took the paper, unfolded it,
cleared his throat, and said, "We the jury find the defendant
not guilty, provided that he returns the mule."
The judge brought his gavel down sharply, saying, "There is
no such verdict in the law. The defendant is either guilty or not
guilty." After giving the charge all over again the judge told the
'5.
6.

Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
EAST, supra note 3, at 467.
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jury to retire and come back with a lawful verdict.
The jury returned in five minutes and the judge asked the
foreman, "Have you reached a verdict?"
"We have, Your Honor."
"Then hand it to the clerk."
The clerk put on his glasses, unfolded the paper, cleared his
throat, and read: "We the jury find the defendant not guilty.
He can keep the mule." 7
Not having read any of the author's former works,8 it is difficult
for me to gauge his talent as an accomplished writer. As I stated
earlier, he tells his story well and-as any autobiographer
should-with highly personal revelations. No doubt the best way to
capsulize all the foregoing verbiage is for me to say-read this book
and you will find out why he is, to those who know him, just Bill
Douglas.
Jon J. Vichich*
Id. at 451.
E.g., W. DOUGLAS, A WILDERNESS BILL OF RIGHTS (1965); W. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF
LIBERTY (1963); W. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE (1958).
* Law Clerk to Honorable John L. Miller, Senior Judge, United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania.
7.

8.

